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In this article, we derive principles of optimal stabilization policy. We show that optimal policy in re-
sponse to shocks keeps prices stable, that the nominal interest rate should be lowand stable, and that
tax instruments play a crucial role. The analysis is based on Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008).
The model we consider is a stochastic production economy, without capital, with cash and credit
goods. Firms are monopolisticcompetitiveand are restricted in setting prices, but are otherwiseidenti-
cal. Government consumption is financed with revenue from labor income and consumption taxes, as
well as seigniorage. For simplicity, we assume that there is state-contingent public debt.
1
The model has three sources of distortions. Because firms are monopolistic competitive, there is a
mark-up distortion. The price setting restrictions are another source of inefficiency. Finally, the need to
raise distortionary taxes to finance public expenditures implies various wedges in marginal decisions.
One of those wedges is caused by the nominal interest rate in the marginal decision between money
and bonds. The nominal interest on short term, riskless, bonds is the opportunity cost of money. Since
the cost of producing money is negligible, a positive nominal interest rate is a distortion. The interplay
between the three potential sources of distortions is at the heart of optimal stabilization policy. As
shown by Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008), optimal policy eliminates the distortions associated with
stickyprices, as wellas the moneydemanddistortion. The markup distortioncan be eliminatedwithan
implicit subsidy financed with the lump-sum revenue from profit taxation. The only remaining distor-
tions are the ones arising from the need to raise distortionary taxation in a competitive, flexible price
environment.
Once it is clear that optimal policy neutralizes the effects of the nominal rigidity, then we can apply the
principles of optimal taxation under flexible prices that are well known after Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) and many others.
The early approach in the literature (see Rotemberg and Woodford 1997 or Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
1999)isto assumethat therearelump-sumtaxes.Those taxesfinancebothgovernmentexpenditures
and a subsidy to production that eliminates the markup distortion. It is also standard to abstract from
the money demand distortion by assuming that the economy is the cashless limit of a sequence of
monetary economies. By keeping prices flat it is possible to eliminate the onlyremainingdistortion, the
nominal rigidity, and achieve the first-best allocation. In this context, price stability is optimal and the
nominalinterest rate moves one-to-onewiththe naturalrealrate of interest, in responseto shocks. But
lump-sum taxes are needed for these results, and those are obviously not available.
An alternative, more elaborate, approach is to assume that, indeed, lump-sum taxes are not feasible,
but to be very selective in the fiscal instruments that are available. Benigno and Woodford (2003),
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(1) Publicdebtisnormallyassumedtobestatenoncontingent,eveniftherearewaysofusingmaturities,orconsumptiontaxes,tomimicstatecontingentdebt.Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), and Siu (2004)assume that onlyone taxcan be used, either the con-
sumption or the labor income tax. They obtain very different qualitative results, from the first-best
ones.
2 Price stability is not optimal and the nominal rate is not the natural rate.
Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2008) solve the optimal fiscal and monetary policy problem assuming that
taxes must be distortionary, but allowing for all the standard taxes. In particular, in this environment,
because there is no capital, the taxes that make sense to assume are consumption and labor income
taxes, in addition to profit taxes. They recover the first-best principles of price stability and the Fried-
man rule, i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, even if their analysis is a second-best one, in which
distortions must be present.
Why should some distortions be fully eliminated, while others are kept? This is certainly against the
general Ramsey principle that distortions should be balanced. There is, however, another well known
principle, due to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), that distortions associated with productive inefficien-
cies are not optimalevenwhenthere are other distortions.Productiveinefficienciesbringthe economy
inside the production possibilities set and it is alwaysbetter to be on the frontier of that set. It turns out
that the distortions caused by sticky prices are productive inefficiencies. Indeed, because price setting
decisions may be staggered, otherwise identical firms may set different prices. This is a productive
inefficiency.
The reason why the Friedman rule is optimal even when there are other distortions, is also related to
the same principle in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Money can be modelled as an intermediate good
that it is not optimal to tax, precisely to ensure efficiency in production. There is another reason, how-
ever, not to taxmoney. Moneyis a free goodthat, regardlessof the optimaltaxrate, shouldhavea very
low price. The nominal interest rate is the price of money, and, therefore, should be close to zero.
3
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We start by analyzing an economy with monopolistic competitive
firms and flexible prices. We show that every allocation in the economy with flexible prices can be im-
plemented with stable prices. We then show that price stability is optimal when there are sticky price
firms. Because, under sticky prices, it is feasible and optimal to replicate the allocations with flexible
prices, we solve the optimal taxation problem under flexible prices. We show that the Friedman rule is
optimal, for preferences that are separable in leisure and homothetic in the consumption goods. We
also show that, for those preferences, the optimal wedges are constant over time and across states,
and that the tax rates do not have to vary with contemporaneous shocks.
2. THE MODEL ECONOMY
4
The model is a standard, Ramsey, optimal taxation model, similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey
(1983) or Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), except that firms are monopolistic competitive and that
there are restrictions in how they set prices.
The economy is inhabited by identical households, a continuum of firms indexed byi, and a govern-
ment. In each period t, each firm uses laborn
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(2) Quantitatively, price stability is close to optimal.
(3) For more on the optimal price of money, see Teles (2003).
(4) We describe the model and derive the results with some detail but we advice the more technical reader to revert to the Appendix.where A
t is the stochastic productivity that is common across goods.
The individual goods aggregate into composite cash goods C
t 1 and credit goods C
t 2 , with the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The households draw utility from these composite goods and disutility from
aggregate laborN
t , according to the utility function:











t are exogenous and stochastic, and must be financed with con-
sumption taxes 
t
c , taxes on labor income 
t
n , and taxes on profits 
t
d and by printing money M
t . For
simplicityweallowfor debt to be state-contingent.
5 Again for simplicity, weassume that profits are fully
taxed, 
t
d  1and that initial wealth is also fully taxed.
The cash goodsC
t 1 must be purchased with money M
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where Q t is the state-contingent price of one unit of money at time t in a particular state, in units of
money at time0, normalized by the probability of occurrence of that state, andR
t is the gross nominal
interest rate from periodt to period t  1 .W
t is the nominal wage. By arbitrage, because the sum of the
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It is then straightforward to see that the relative price between the cash and the credit goods is the
nominal interest rate,R















The cash good is more expensive because it must be bought with money. The nominal interest rate
cannot be negative, R
t 
 1 , since otherwise households could make arbitrarily large profits by issuing
bonds and holding money. The marginal rate of substitution between credit goods and leisure must
also be equal to the relative price,
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noncontingent bonds that give a sure gross returnR
































. The two marginal benefits must be equal.
For now, weassume that firms set flexibleprices. Because all monopolists face the same demand and












The markupis a functionof , whichis the elasticityof substitutionbetweenanyof the individualgoods.
Notice that as the elasticityincreases, the markup is reduced, to the point whereit is zero, whichwould
correspond to perfect competition.
Since all firms set the same price, they also sell the same quantities, so that the individual quantities
are equal to the aggregate. The aggregate resource constraints are, then,
CCG A N
t ttt t 12   .
3. EQUILIBRIA WITH FLEXIBLE PRICES
The standard approach in the literature on Ramsey taxation in these kinds of models is to identify the
smallest set of conditions restricting the equilibrium allocations of consumption and labor, in order to
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(6) Notice thatQ 0 1  and that the state-contingent pricesQ t are normalized by the probabilities ofoccurence of the state. 666 6make it easier to solve the optimal problem. We show formally in the Appendix that the allocations are
restricted only by the following implementability conditions,
Eu C u C u N
t



















and the feasibility conditions
CCG A N
t ttt t 12   . (6)
The first conditionisobtainedreplacingthepricesandtaxesfromthemarginalconditionsofthehouse-
holds in the household budget constraint (3). Because the condition is derived using the conditions of
the households only, it does not depend on the price-setting restrictions. The second condition en-
sures that the nominal interest rate is nonnegative, and also does not depend on whether prices are
flexible or sticky.
These conditions are all that is needed to characterize the equilibrium allocations for the consumption
of the two goods and labor. They are obviously necessary conditions, since they were obtained using
the equilibrium conditions. They are also sufficient, meaning that all the other equilibrium conditions
can be satisfied by the choice of policies, prices or quantities other than the consumption of the two
goodsandlabor. It turnsoutthatthiscanbeshown,settingthepricelevelconstantovertimeandequal
to some arbitrary number, PP
t  . This means that each equilibrium allocation can be implemented
with a price level that does not depend on the shocks. This result is instrumental for the main point we
want to make in this article.
In order to implement an equilibrium allocation with constant prices there is a specific role for the fiscal
and monetary policy instruments. To see this, we take a particular allocation for the two consumption












pins downthe nominal interest rate,R
t 	1 , whichis nonnegative because of the implementability con-
dition (5). For a constant price level,PP



































can be satisfied by the choice of consumption taxes 
t
c . Notice that it is possible to do this for a con-
sumption tax that does not depend on the contemporaneous shocks. Given 
0
c , we use the condition
fort  1, to determine 
1
c , the conditions fort  2, to determine 
2
c , and so on.
The money supply is whatever satisfies the cash-in-advance condition (1). The price-setting equa-
tions,
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determine the nominal wage W























are satisfied by the choice of the labor income tax 
t
n .

































t 2 ,i s
constant, as is the case for the class of utilityfunctions that wewillanalyzelater. Then the implementa-










n is constant, and if 
t
c does not move
with the contemporaneous shocks, then 
t
n will also be independent of the shocks.
The equilibrium allocations described by the conditions above are the same here as in Lucas and
Stokey (1983) and Chari et al. (1991), where firms are assumed to be competitive. Indeed, the
implementability conditions are independent of , and therefore of the markup. Monopolistic competi-
tion creates a distortion but it also creates the lump-sum tax revenue necessary to subsidize produc-
tion, to eliminate the distortion. The revenue from the full taxation of profits is exactly the revenue
needed to finance the implicit subsidy to labor needed to eliminate the monopoly distortion.
We have so far made one very important point, that every allocation under flexible prices, and, in par-
ticular, theoptimalone,canbeimplementedwithconstantprices.The importanceof thispointisthat, if
prices can be constant, this means that if firms were restricted in setting prices, those restrictions
would not be relevant. It is then possible under sticky prices to achieve the same allocation as under
flexible prices. It follows that we cannot do better under flexible prices than under sticky prices.
Butmaybewecoulddobetterunderstickypricesthanunderflexibleprices.This isonlysurprisingif we
forget that the economy is distorted, so that adding one more distortion can be better. It turns out that
the distortion from sticky prices is of a particular type that should be fully eliminated even if there are
other distortions. If prices are sticky, firms that are otherwise very similar may charge different prices.
This means that production is inefficient, and productive inefficiencies are not optimal even if there are
other distortions.
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Suppose nowthat prices are sticky, and that firms set prices at different times so that there is price dis-
persion. If otherwise identical firms set different prices p
it , then the aggregate resource constraints





















































is the measure of the resource cost due to price dispersion.
The set of implementable allocations under sticky prices must be characterized by the same two
implementability conditions under flexible prices (4) and (5), because those were derived with the
households conditions only, regardless of how prices were set. In addition, instead of the resource
constraints (6), constraints (10) above must be satisfied.
There are certainly other equilibrium restrictions, but they are not relevant for the point we want to
make. The point we make now is that allocations under flexible prices dominate the ones under sticky




















, when prices are the same,
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, otherwise, under flexible prices it is possible to
minimize the resource cost due to price dispersion. The resource cost is zero under flexible prices, in
which case all the firms set the same price.
The intuition for this result is the following.Firms in this set up are symmetric, so that, if prices are flexi-
ble, they must set the same price. Production is then efficient, the economyis on the production possi-
bilities frontier, and the job of the policy maker is to optimally distort along the frontier. Instead, if firms
set different prices, there is a productive inefficiency, and the equilibrium will be inside the production
possibilities set. This is never optimal, even when the economy is distorted. It is alwaysbetter to avoid
productive inefficiencies and optimally distort along the frontier. This result, that productive inefficien-
cies are not desirable in a distorted world is due to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), that applied it to the
optimal taxation of intermediate goods. As they show, when there are taxes on the final consumption
goods, intermediate goods should not be taxed. Sticky prices act like differential taxation of
intermediate goods.
Weconclude,then,thatpricestabilityisoptimalunderquitegeneralconditions.Stabilizationpolicythat
exploits the nonneutrality of money, to achieve any goal other than price stability is not desirable, un-
less, of course, taxes cannot be used for stabilization policy.
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Onceitisclearthattheoptimalallocationcanbefoundinthesetofallocationsunderflexibleprices,we
can solve a Ramsey problem where the optimal allocation is the one that maximizes utility in the set
characterized by the implementability conditions under flexible prices, (4), (5), and (6).
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where  is the multiplier of (4), which measures the excess burden of taxation.
It is optimal, then, not to distort betweenconsumption of the cash good and of the credit good, and the
optimal wedge between any of the two consumption goods and leisure is constant over time and inde-
pendent of shocks. The policy that implements these optimal wedges can be seen using the equilib-
rium conditions for the households, (7), (8), and (9).
The optimal nominal interest rate is zero,Rs
t ()  1 , so that the Friedman rule is optimal. The opportu-
nitycost of money, whichis the nominalinterestrate, shouldbezero, inordernot to distort betweenthe










n , should be
constant over time.
We have seen above that the optimal allocation can be implemented with stable prices and with con-
sumption taxes that do not depend on the contemporaneous shocks. How can the nominal interest
rate be zero and prices be stable when the real rate is positive and volatile? This does not violate the
Fisher equation, (8), because the consumption taxes can move to verify the equation. They move with
a lag.










n is constant, and there-
fore, because the consumption tax can be predetermined, the labor income tax can also be predeter-
mined. Both taxes have to move, but with a lag, in response to lagged information.
In this economy, in which the utility function is separable in leisure and homothetic in the consumption
goods,itisoptimaltotaxallconsumptiongoodsatthesamerate,ineverydateandstate.Thosecondi-
tions on preferences are the conditions for uniform taxation of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972). This ex-
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is constant over time.





tt t PC M
makes it clear that, with stable prices and predetermined consumption taxes, the money supply has to
be elastic. It must move in response to shocks to accommodate the movements in transactions.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Wehavesummarizedthemainprinciplesofstabilizationpolicyassumingthatbothfiscalandmonetary
policy can be used to optimally respond to shocks. The optimal policy when prices are sticky is to neu-
tralizetheeffectsofthatfriction,bymakingsurethatpricesarestable.That way, theeconomybehaves
as if prices were flexible. The resulting economy is still a distorted economy because the need to raise
distortionary taxes cannot be overcome.
The reason why it is optimal to eliminate one distortion, when there are other remaining distortions, is
thesamereasonwhyinDiamondandMirrlees(1971)itisoptimalnottotaxintermediategoods,evenif
final goods must be taxed. Sticky prices create productive inefficiencies, just like the taxes on interme-
diate goods, that are not desirable even when there are other distortions.
The effects of the remaining distortions can be minimized using what we know of optimal taxation un-
der flexible prices. In that context, the Friedman rule is generally optimal, and uniform taxation across
different goods is approximately optimal.
In order to follow the Friedman rule and still have stable prices, the consumption taxes have to move.
They only have to move with a lag, though. Because uniform taxation is approximately optimal, taxes
on labor income also move with lagged information.
In the real worldtaxes are also sticky, possiblystickier than this model wouldimply. One conclusionwe
draw from this analysis, is that those conditions should probably be revised.
The model we analyze is very simple. The world is obviously much more complex; there are certainly
many other frictions that we have abstracted from. In a more complex model with other restrictions on
decisions, the results we derive in this article will certainly not hold exactly. They may still be approxi-
mately correct, though.
APPENDIX
The agents in the model are identical households, a continuum of firms indexedbyi [,] 01, and a gov-
ernment. The history of events up to period is denoted byt and the initial realizations
0 is given. () s
t
is the probability of the occurrence of states
t .
Each firm uses labor ns
i
t () to produce ys
i
t () that can be used as a cash goodcs
i
t




2 () , or public consumption gs
i
t () .The technology is
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where As
t () is the productivity that is common across goods.
Households draw utility from composite cash goods Cs
t
1 () and credit goods Cs
t
2 () and disutility
from aggregate laborNs
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ct s () , taxesonlaborincome
nt s () ,
and taxes on profits 
dt s ()  1and by printing money Ms
t () .
The households
The households start period t with nominal wealth () s
t . They decide to buy money balances
Ms
t () , riskfree nominal bonds Bs
t () that pay Rs Bs
tt () () units of money one period later, and
Bs
t ()
1 units of state-contingent nominal securities. These bonds pay one unit of money at the begin-
ning of periodt  1in states
t 1 and costQs s
tt (| )
1 units of money in states
t . Thus, the purchases
of assets by the households must satisfy













At the end of the period, the households receive labor income Ws Ns
tt () () , where Ws
t () is the
nominal wage. The evolution of nominal wealth is governed by
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t () , is used to purchase consumption of the cash good, Cs
t
1 () , according to the
cash-in-advance constraint
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which is the money cost to buy one unit of the composite goods.
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The last two equations imply the arbitrage condition
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We can replace in the budget constraint the intertemporal prices Qs s
t (|)
0 using (25), and use the
intertemporal conditions (26), the intratemporal conditions (23) and (24), and the cash-in-advance
constraints (19), to write the budget constraint as the implementability condition



















It is worth noting that the implementability condition (29) does not depend on the price-setting restric-
tions.
The government
Given the exogenous aggregate government purchases,Gs
t () , and the consumer prices, ps
i
t () ,


































Given full profit taxation, 
dt s ()  1 for alls
t , a government policy consists of public consumption of
each good, gs
i
t () , money supply, Ms
t () , taxes on consumption and labor income, 
ct s () and

nt s () , nominal interest rates, Rs
t () , and debt supplies, Bs
g t () and Bs
gt ()




If the budget constraint of the households and the market-clearing conditions hold, then the budget
constraint of the government is also satisfied.
The firms
Eachgoodi [,] 01isproducedbyamonopolistfirmthatfacestheconstantelasticitydemandfunction
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obtained from the demand functions for the private and public goods, (21), (22) and (30), where
Ys C s C s Gs
ttt t () () () () 
12 .
We now assume that all firms set flexible prices. The flexible price firms choose prices to maximize
profits at each period t 
 0,






t ()() () () 	 ,
















Demand must be equal to supply for each good i and for labor according to (11) and (15).
Equilibria
The set of equilibria is characterized by the household marginal conditions (20), (21), (22), (23), (24),
(25), (26), and the cash-in-advance constraints (19), together with the nonnegativity constraint on the









the price-setting conditions (32) characterize the optimal behavior of the firms; the government pur-
chases public goods according to (30) and chooses the other policy variables, satisfying the budget
constraint, which, given the market-clearing conditions, can be written as the household budget con-
straint (29); finally, the market-clearing conditions (11) and (15) must hold.
Equilibrium allocations under flexible prices
We can characterize the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices with only a few condi-
tions. In particular, the set of implementable allocations for the consumption goods and labor,
 ! Cs Cs N s
tt t
12 () ,() , () , is characterized by the implementability conditions



























and the feasibility conditions
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These conditions are necessary and sufficient to characterize the set of equilibrium allocations
 ! Cs Cs N s
tt t
t 12 0
() ,() , ()


. That they are necessary conditions is straightforward. We have
shown before that (33) and (34) are equilibrium conditions. Since the prices are the same for all firms,
consumptionandlaborinputarealsothesamefor everygoodi [,] 01, sothattheresourceconstraints
(11)and(15)imply(35).Inordertoshowthattheyaresufficientconditions,weneedtoshowthatallthe
other equilibrium conditions are satisfied for the choice of policies, prices or other quantities. We will
show this now setting the price level constant over time and equal to some arbitrary number,
Ps P
t ()  .
The household marginal conditions on the choice of cash and credit goods, (23), determine uniquely
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restricts the process for 
ct s () . Notice that if the consumption tax wasmade invariant to the contem-
poraneous information, given 
c s ()
0 , there would be a single solution for it. If the cash-in-advance
constraint, (19), holds with equality, then, given 
c s ()
0 , the money supply is uniquely determined.






























. Finally, the prices of the state-contingent debt,
Qs s
tt (| )
1 , are given by (25).
Price stability is optimal.
Suppose now that prices are sticky. The result above that, under flexible prices, it is possible to imple-
ment each allocation with a constant price level implies that, if there were sticky price restrictions, for
that policy, the restriction would not be binding. This means that it is possible to achieve, under sticky
prices, the allocations under flexible prices. It follows, that it is not possible to do worse under sticky
prices than under flexible prices, but it might be possible to do better. We now show that it is not the
case.
If we add up the market-clearing conditions for each good i, (11), and use the demand functions (21),
(22), and (30), as well as the resource constraints (15), we obtain the following aggregate resource
constraints:
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The set of implementable allocations ! Cs Cs N s
tt t
12 () ,() , () under flexible prices is character-
ized by the implementability conditions (33) and (34) as well as the feasibility conditions (35). The set
of implementable allocations under sticky prices must be characterized by the same two
implementabilityconditions,(33)and(34),becausethosewerederivedwiththehouseholdsconditions
only, regardless of how prices are set. In addition, instead of the resource constraints (35), the con-
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tt () () # , under
flexible prices it is possible to minimize the resource cost due to price dispersion.
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